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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE SAFE and reliable operation of power systems is critical to the economy and security of a nation. The high integration of communication networks and information technologies enables the operators to monitor the operation of power systems and take emergency controls to mitigate risks. However, power systems are also subject to high risk of cyber-attacks due to the vulnerability of the communication networks in today's more complicated international environment. Liu et al. [1] demonstrated that an attacker can design false data that obeys Kirchhoff's Current Law (KCL) and Kirchhoff's Voltage Law (KVL) to avoid being detected by the traditional bad data detection procedure if the network information of the entire power network is known to the attacker. These false data will induce the operator to make wrong decisions that lead to economic loss or insecure operations. Liu [1] work has motivated researchers to do extensive study to investigate the attacking mechanisms of false data injection attacks and the impact on the operation of 1949-3053 c 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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power systems. The existing works reveal that false data injection attacks can disrupt economic dispatch [2] and locational marginal price in a real-time market [3] and real-time topology [4] . More works can be found in [5] - [11] . The drawbacks of the existing works are two-fold: 1) It is assumed that an attacker can have the network information (topology information and line parameters) of the entire power network. In reality, this is an impractical assumption. First, power grid network information is strongly protected due to its sensitivity to the homeland security. Second, today's power grid has thousands of buses and lines which means an attacker has to obtain a huge amount of network information.
2) Most existing works are based on DC state estimation, which is different from the AC model in real-world state estimation in power systems. It has been demonstrated that the false data constructed using the DC model would contribute to a large residual to the AC state estimation.
For the first practical issue, it has been proved that the very strong condition in [1] - [11] for the DC state estimation that the full network information of a power network is assumed to be known to an attacker can be relaxed. We proposed a more practical false data injection model [12] which requires only the local network information. In our model, an attacker only needs to obtain the network information of the attacking region instead of that of the entire power grid. This is done by making sure that the variations of phase angles of all boundary buses connected to the same island of the non-attacking region are the same. A heuristic algorithm [13] was proposed to find an optimal attacking region which requires the reduced network information.
For the second practical issue, there are a few papers [14] - [16] that address the issue. However, the proposed AC attack models in [14] - [16] still include the impractical assumption that the full network information must be known to an attacker. Additionally, the AC model in [14] - [16] requires the attacker to have the knowledge of the estimated state of the power system due to the nonlinearity of AC power flow. In practice, however, the phase angles of most buses are unavailable since so far there have been a few number of Phase Measurement Units (PMU) installed to provide such information. This will obviously further burden the efforts to construct an undetectable attack vector. Thus, the lack of consideration of these mentioned difficulties to construct an attack vector would make the proposed AC models impractical and cannot reflect the attack behaviors of an attacker.
It seems to be much more difficult to launch a successful attack against the AC state estimation. This might contribute to one possible explanation for the fact that so far the false data injection attacks against real-world power grids are seldom reported although a lot of attack models were proposed to reveal the vulnerability of power systems. However, from the perspective of a defender, it is necessary to evaluate if an attacker has techniques to avoid the difficulties to construct an undetectable attack vector. If so, power systems are still subject to high risk of cyber-attacks. A practical attack model is supposed to enable an attacker to construct an undetectable attack vector against the AC state estimation without paying expensive cost for obtaining the network information and bus phase angles. In this paper, our focus is to investigate the possibility of attacking the AC state estimation using such a practical attack model. The main idea of the proposed model is to construct an attack vector in a given attacking region based on AC power flow equations with only a few voltage and line flow measurements associated with the boundary buses. The main contributions of this paper are three-fold:
(1) We propose a practical attack model against AC state estimation. The proposed model relaxes the strong condition in the existing attack models that the construction of an attack vector relies on the estimated state of the power grid. The construction of the attack vector relies on the angle differences of lines instead of the actual values of phase angles. Secondly, the proposed attack model relaxes the strong condition that the network information of the entire power grid must be known to construct an undetectable attack vector. Instead, we show that an attacker only needs to obtain the network information of the attacking region. (2) We propose a simple method to calculate the angle difference between any two buses in a power network that are not connected directly. This is achieved by selecting an optimal path that connects the two buses and summing up the angle differences of the lines along this path. (3) Our work provides a basis to study the attack behaviors under the AC case and a theoretical guide to develop cost-effective protection strategies and detection methods. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the concept of undetectable bad data injection attacks. Section III introduces the principle of false data injection attacks against AC state estimation with incomplete network information. Section IV proposes an algorithm to construct an attack vector using a few voltage and line flow measurements associated with the boundary buses. Section V demonstrates the proposed model with the IEEE 14-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. REVIEW OF THE ATTACK MODEL AGAINST DC STATE ESTIMATION WITH INCOMPLETE NETWORK INFORMATION
In modern power systems, a large amount of sensors are installed to measure the real-time operation data of the system and transmit these data to the control center via communication networks. Based on these data, the real-time system state x is estimated by the well-known least square method.
where z is the vector of measurements, and H is the Jacobian matrix of the power grid. Due to the existence of measuring errors and disruptions, z = Hx. The residue r is defined as
The operator sets a threshold value for r to detect the bad data. If r is greater than the given threshold value, then bad data is thought to exist. However, Liu [1] showed that if an attacker can design the injected false data that satisfies z = H x, then, the residue r will not increase due to the injected data, so the injected bad data can avoid being detected. Such an attack is thus called stealthy false data injection attack.
In [12] , we have proved that if an attacker designs an attack vector that ensures all boundary buses in the attacking region connected to the same non-attacking region have the same incremental phase angle, then the additional power flows due to the injected false power will not flow out of the attacking region and the power flows in the non-attacking region will remain unchanged. In this case, the attacker only needs to obtain the topology and line parameters in the attacking region to construct the attack vector. The feasibility of a nonzero attack vector can be guaranteed as long as the number of nonattackable buses in the attacking region is no more than the number of non-boundary buses [12] .
A heuristic method was also proposed to determine the optimal attacking region that requires the reduced network parameter information [13] . The attacking region starts from a small region and expands until it is a feasible one. The simulation results showed that only a small part of network information is necessary to attack a bus or a line. The proposed attack model with incomplete network information further revealed the vulnerability of power systems to cyber-attacks since a weak attacker can still launch an attack without too much cost.
III. ATTACK AGAINST AC STATE ESTIMATION
As shown in Fig. 1 , a connected power network is separated into region A and region N by a set of tie lines. Suppose an attacker aims to attack the measurements in region A.
The measurement set z is separated into two parts. The first part z 1 includes all the measurements in the attacking region A excluding the flow measurements on the tie lines. And the second part z 2 contains the remaining measurements. Accordingly, the state variables are also separated into two parts. The first part x 1 includes all the buses in the attacking region excluding the boundary buses. The second part x 2 includes the remaining buses.
The goal of an attacker is to construct an undetectable attack vector for the attacking region. The control center will validate the received data through the residual check. So, to avoid being detected, the injected false data into the attacking region should not increase the residual of the state estimation significantly. Considering the difficulty of obtaining the network parameters, the construction of the attack vector only requires the network information of the attacking region.
Without the injected false data, the residual is attributed to the inaccuracy of the measurements. In theory, if all the measurements are free of noise, then the residual should be equal or close to zero. However, in practice, the inaccuracy of the measurements will make these measurements inconsistent, which would increase the residual. In general, the less consistent the measurements, the greater the corresponding residual would be. Therefore, a good strategy for an attacker is to inject false data that are consistent with the physical characteristics of power systems into the attacking region. That is, the injected false data z 1 obey KCL and KVL,
and the measurements in the non-attacking region remain unchanged. As a result, the attacker does not need to know the network information of the region beyond the attacking region and attack the measurements in the non-attacking region. Next, we analyze the impact of the injected false data on the residual of the state estimation. Without the injection of the false data, suppose that the estimated state of the system isx = [x 1x2 ] T . Then, we have
where e 1 , e 2 are the corresponding error vectors for z 1 , z 2 . As z 2 is only a function of x 2 , H 21 = 0. Different from their counterparts in DC state estimation, the Jacobian matrices H 11 , H 12 , H 22 in AC state estimation depend on the state vector. Eq. (4) can be rewritten as
After the false data z 1 is injected, the measurement vector becomes z = z 1 z 2 T and the residual becomes
If we construct a feasible estimated state vectorx = [ x 1x2 ] T , then the following constraint must hold
This indicates that the overall residual will decrease due to the injected false data. This is because the injected false data into the attacking region are more consistent (i.e., satisfying KCL and KVL) than the original measurement data. It should be noted that false data with small residual does not mean the false data itself should be very close to the true value. In fact, an attacker can construct an attacking vector that can lead to a significant disruption to a power system while keeping the residual of false data low [1] . To ensure the feasibility of (3), the flows of the lines in the attacking region are determined by (9) (10) .
For the non-boundary buses in the attacking region, KCL applies according to (3) . Thus, the power injection at a bus is the algebraic sum of the flows of all lines connected to this bus. However, for the boundary buses in the attacking region as shown in Fig. 2 , since parts of the lines connected to this bus are located in the non-attacking region, the following power balance equations (11)- (12) hold
which gives
Again, according to (3), the real and reactive flows of the lines out of the attacking region are determined by (15) and (16):
Constraints (15) and (16) indicate that the flow measurements of the lines in the non-attacking region are not attacked. So, the right-hand-side terms in (13)- (14) are given although unknown to the attacker. This will lead to the changes of Jacobian matrix of the power injection at the boundary buses, which will be shown in the next section.
It can be seen from (3) that the construction of the attack vector z 1 relies on the following strong condition.
(Strong condition): an attacker needs to know the estimated values of voltage magnitudes and phase angles of the boundary buses in the attacking region.
However, it is impractical to assume that an attacker can have the estimated result of the state estimation considering the difficulties mentioned before. A practical AC attack model should relax the strong condition that the construction of an attack vector requires the estimated state of the system.
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF ATTACK VECTOR
In this section, we propose an algorithm to construct an undetectable attack vector against AC state estimation.
A. Relaxation of the Strong Condition
As mentioned in the previous section, a practical attack model against the AC state estimation should not require the estimated state of the system to construct an undetectable attack vector. In light of this, we propose a practical attack model by relaxing (3) as follows:
1) the estimated voltage magnitudes at the boundary buses in the attacking region are replaced with the corresponding voltage measurements;
2) the flows on the tie lines determined using the estimated voltage magnitudes and phase angles are replaced with the corresponding line flow measurements on these tie lines.
The challenge here is to deal with the estimated phase angles at the boundary buses in the attacking region. One possible approach is to get the phase angles by accessing the corresponding PMUs. However, there will not be enough PMUs installed to provide such information. On the other hand, it is still expensive to deploy a PMU to obtain this information. In practice, for an attacker with limited budget and resource, it might be impractical to do so. Hence, a more practical attack model should not require the efforts of obtaining the actual values of phase angles.
This might be a good signal to the defender. Because the cost of launching an attack becomes large, the risk of cyber-attack would be mitigated. However, it is essential for a defender to investigate whether there is any possibility for an attacker to construct such an attack vector without obtaining the phase angles at the boundary buses.
From Eq. (9) of the real power flow of a line, it can be observed that the line flow is actually determined by the angle difference of the line, not by the actual values of phase angles. If the angle difference is determined, then the line flow is determined. In other words, the information we need to determine the attack vector z 1 in (3) is the angle differences of lines rather than the actual phase angles at buses. The actual values of phase angles at the boundary buses are not a must if we have known the angle differences between these buses. This motivates us to construct the attack vector by angle differences of lines, instead of bus phase angles used in the traditional power flow calculation.
For the boundary buses, (3) indicates that their phase angles are fixed to the estimated values of the state estimation. Consequently, the angle difference between any two boundary buses is also fixed. Suppose the actual estimated phase angle at buses i and j areθ i ,θ j , then (17) holds:
Constraint (17) represents that if the phase angles of all the boundary buses are increased by α, then the angle difference between any pair of boundary buses are unchanged. Thus, the phase angles at the boundary buses that are used to calculate the attack vector in (3) can be determined by the following two steps:
Step 1: pick an arbitrary value for one boundary bus, e.g., β;
Step 2: determine the phase angles for the remaining boundary buses according to the angle differences.
As we randomly select a value for the boundary bus, so the determined phase angels at boundary buses through
Step 1-Step 2 do not represent the actual phase angles. However, the resulting angle differences between these boundary buses are the same as the actual angle differences. So, the line flows will not change. By doing so, the strong condition that an attacker needs to obtain the actual values of the estimated phase angles in the state estimation is relaxed. An attacker only needs to know the differences of the estimated phase angles between the boundary buses.
B. Determination of Angle Difference Between Boundary Buses
As shown in figure 3 , if there exists a path k that connects two neighboring boundary buses (e.g., b, d), then it is trivial to prove that following a specified direction, (18) holds,
According to (18) , to determine the value of θ b − θ d , we can select a path k that connects buses b and d, and then sum the angle differences of all lines along this path. By doing so, an attacker does not need to obtain the actual values of phase angles. However, how do we determine the angle difference of a line without knowing the actual phase angles at the terminal buses of the line?
Recall that constraint (19) holds for a typical transmission network.
Introducing (19) into (9), we can have
Then, the angle difference can be determined using (21)
Eq. (21) indicates that the angle difference of a line can be calculated based on its real flow measurement. For each line, an attacker needs to obtain one line flow measurement and its line parameters to calculate the corresponding angle difference.
The error of the calculated angle difference is attributed to two parts: (1) the inaccuracy of the measurements used to determine the angle difference; (2) the approximation of the AC flow model by (19). Thus, the error of angle difference calculated using (9) and (19) relies on how good constraint (19) is satisfied. It has been proved that the greater the ratio of reactance X to resistance R of a line is, the smaller the difference would be. Thus, to decrease the error caused by the approximation using (19), we aim to determine an optimal path k in the attacking region that has the maximum average ratio ρ k of X to R.
The number of lines along the path is controlled to reduce the effort of obtaining the measurements to estimate angle differences.
To sum up, the proposed practical attack model is characterized by the four properties as follows:
(1) the false data injected into the attacking region follows KCL and KVL;
(2) the voltage magnitudes at the boundary buses in the attacking region are set to the values of the corresponding measurements;
(3) the flows on the tie lines are set to the readings of the corresponding measurements; (4) the construction of an attack vector relies on the angle differences of lines, instead of the actual values of phase angles. The angle difference of a line is determined using the corresponding voltage and line flow measurements.
This relaxation method would add some increase to the residual r . However, it can be seen from (8) that such an attack can be successful as long as the increase is less than r − r . As mentioned in Section III, the flow measurements of lines in the attacking region are determined by (9) and (10), so KVL holds for these line measurements. In addition, the power injection measurement at a non-boundary bus in the attacking region is the algebraic sum of the flows of lines connected to this bus. As the measurements at the non-boundary buses and on the lines in the attacking region are consistent with KCL and KVL, the estimation errors of angle differences will only impact the consistency of a small number of measurements related to the boundary buses. Thus, when the size of attacking region is enlarged, in general, the percentage of consistent measurements will be increased and the corresponding residual will be further reduced. Consider one extreme example that the attacking region covers the entire power grid. In this case, all the measurements will obey KCL and KVL, which is equivalent to setting the measurements noise-free. Accordingly, the residual will be reduced significantly.
The feasibility of the proposed attack strategy will be verified in the case study. It should be clarified that the purpose of our paper is to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed attack model. That is, an attacker is able to construct an undetectable attack vector with the incomplete network information and without the actual values of phase angles. So far, it is challenging to mathematically prove that the residual increase is less than r − r in a strict manner. The same difficulty exists in the previous works [14] - [16] due to two reasons. First, the AC state estimation is a high-dimensional non-linear problem, so the superstition law in the DC state estimation cannot be applied. Secondly, there is no analytical method to determine the residual of the AC state estimation. Instead, it is determined by the numerical simulation.
C. Algorithm for the Construction of False Data
As discussed, to ensure that the false data injection attack cannot be detected by the traditional bad data detection procedure, the overall residual with the injection of false data must be less than or equal to the set threshold value. Thus, we inject the false data that follows KCL and KVL into the attacking region. The line flows in the attacking region are determined by (9)-(10). For the non-boundary buses in the attacking region, the power injection at a bus is the algebraic sum of the flows of all lines connected to this bus. For the boundary buses in the attacking region, the power injections are determined using (13) and (14) . Then, the algorithm of constructing an attacker vector is summarized as follows:
Step 1: Initialize the state variable
Step 2: Compute the attack vector [ p q P Q] T based on the current state vector
Step 3: Determine if constraints (24a)-(24.c) are satisfied. If yes, stop; otherwise, go to the next step;
The real power injections at a bus, the real/reactive flows of a line are enforced within a lower and upper bound to decrease the probability of being detected. This is because the operator in the control center usually has the knowledge of the power flow distribution. For example, if the power injection at a bus is far from the normal quantity, then the data will be detected with a high probability since this data is very doubtful.
Step 4: Calculate the incremental x = [ θ V ] T by solving the optimization problem
where S t (t = 1, 2, . . . , 10) is the introduced non-negative slack variable. And the submatrices in the Jacobian matrix are defined as
The detailed expressions of Jacobian matrices H 1 − H 4 can be found in [17] . In particular, for the boundary buses in the attacking region, according to (13), we have
For the non-boundary buses in the attacking region, the non-zero elements are the same as the ones in [17] . Other non-zero elements in H 5 , H 6 , H 7 , H 8 are calculated in a similar way. And the coefficient matrix G is the transition matrix that convert bus phase angle vector into line angle difference vector.
Step 5: Update the state variable
Then go to step 2. Through step 1 to step 5, an attacker is able to construct an undetectable attack vector against the AC state estimation: without obtaining any bus phase angle since the angle difference of a line is adopted.
It should be clarified that the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that an attacker is able to construct an undetectable attack vector against the AC state estimation: (1) without having the network information of the entire network; (2) without obtaining any bus phase angle. The optimality of attack strategy is not discussed. For example, how do we select an optimal attacking region? This will be left for future work.
V. CASE STUDY
In this section, we test the proposed attack model against the AC state estimation using the modified IEEE 14-bus system and the IEEE 118-bus system [18] . We assume that both systems are fully measured. That is, we need three measurements (real and reactive power injections, voltage magnitude) for each bus and four measurements (real and reactive powers on both the "from bus" and the "to bus" sides) for each line. So, there are 122 measurements for the IEEE 14-bus system and 980 measurements for the IEEE 118-bus system. In this paper, they are perturbed based on the base case AC power flow solution. Note that the phase angles, which are not measured if there is no PMU, are the same as those in the base case AC power flow solution.
Without loss of generality, the upper and lower bounds for bus power injections are set to 0.5 and 1.5 times of the power injection in the base case. The maximum number of lines along a path is controlled to be no more than five. The limitations for the line real and reactive flows are enforced within 1.5 times of flow limits. The upper and lower bounds for voltage magnitude are 0.8 and 1.2 times of rated voltages. The angle difference of a line is limited within (-15
• , 15
• ). 
A. Construction of False Data Injections
First, the IEEE 14-bus system is used to demonstrate the attack scheme in detail. The given attacking region, circled by the dashed line in Fig. 4 , is composed of buses 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and lines 6-11, 6-12, 6-13, 9-10, 9-14, 10-11, 12-13, 13-14. Buses 6 and 9 are the boundary buses in the attacking region. Buses 4 and 5 are the boundary buses in the non-attacking region. The attacking region is connected to the non-attacking region through three two tie lines 6-5, 9-4, and 9-7.
Since the phase angles at boundary buses are unchanged, the value of θ 6 − θ 9 is fixed. This indicates that the sum of angle differences of lines along a path that connects the two buses is also fixed. There are three paths from bus 6 to bus 9 that are listed in Table I . Column 3 gives the average value of the ratio of reactance X to resistance R for each path. It can be seen that the second path has the maximum ratio, so it is chosen as the optimal path to calculate the angle difference between bus 6 and bus 9.
According to (18) and (21), an attacker needs to obtain the line flow measurements p 6−13 , p 13−14 , p 14−9 and the line parameters for lines 6-13, 13-14, 14-9 to determine the angle difference between buses 6 and 9. Then,
= x 6−13 p 6−13 + x 13−14 p 13−14 + x 14−9 p 14−9
= 0.0050
The actual angle difference between bus 6 and bus 9 based on the base case AC power flow solution is 0.0058. The calculated angle difference and the actual angle difference are fairly close, especially considering the fact that the line flow measurements have errors. Table II gives the real and reactive powers at the buses in the attacking regions that are determined based on the set voltage magnitudes (column 3) and phase angles (column 2). As can been seen, the voltage magnitudes at the boundary buses 6 and 9 are set to the values of the corresponding voltage magnitude measurements. Constraint (30) shows that the angle difference between bus 6 and 9 is 0.0050. As discussed before, it is not necessary to know the actual values of the phase angles if the angle differences between boundary buses are known. Instead, we pick an arbitrary value for the phase angle at one boundary bus, and then calculate the phase angles at the remaining boundary buses according to the angle differences. Without loss of generality, we set θ 6 = 0, then θ 9 = −0.0050. Note that these values are different from those in Table VI in Appendix A. The voltage magnitudes and phase angles of the remaining buses, which are free variables and are set arbitrarily, are given in the second column in Table II . They can also be set to achieve certain objectives, which is outside the scope of this paper.
For buses 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, the KCL and KVL apply, so the power injection at each bus is equal to the sum of the flows of the lines connected to this bus. However, for the power injections at boundary buses 6 and 9, since lines 6-5 and 9-4 are located in the non-attacking region, the line flow measurements on lines 5-6 and 4-9 are not attacked. According to (13) and (14), the power injections at the boundary buses 6 and 9 are calculated as Table VII in Appendix A. The flows of the remaining lines are determined according to (9) and (10) .
We use boundary bus 6 to show the detailed process of calculating the real power injection. According to (31), the flows of lines 6-11, 6-12, 6-13 are calculated based on the given phase angles in the second column in Table II , which are 1.1215, 1.2865, 2.1831, respectively. However, the flow of line 6-5 cannot be calculated in this way since it is in the non-attacking region. Instead, it will be set to the value of the line measurement, i.e., p m 6−5 = −0.4668 (see Table VII in Appendix A). Thus, the power injection at bus 6 will be 4.1243.
Next, we analyze the required effort for constructing the attack vector. As discussed in Section IV-A, the voltage magnitudes at the boundary buses are set to the values of the corresponding measurements, so the voltage measurements at buses 6 and 9 are required. According to (13) and (14), 6 real/reactive flow measurements on tie lines 6-5, 9-4 and 9-7 are needed to determine the power injections at boundary buses 6 and 9. According to (18) and (21), to calculate the angle difference between bus 6 and 9, the attacker needs to obtain three real flow measurements on lines 6-13, 13-14, 14-9. Thus, 11 measurements (2 voltage measurements and 9 line flow measurements), less than 1/10 of the total number of measurements (122) in the system, are required to determine the attack vector. Moreover, no preattack phase angle of any bus other than the boundary buses, actual or estimated, is needed. The pre-attack phase angle differences of boundary buses are estimated based on a few measurements. In comparison, in the existing AC attack models, an attacker needs to estimate the voltage magnitudes and phase angles of all buses, which requires the measurements of the entire system. Furthermore, similar to the DC attack model in [12] , the network information of the entire system is not required in the proposed model. The attacker only needs to obtain the network information of the attacking region. In comparison, the network information of the entire system is required in the existing AC attack models. So, the attacking cost associated with the proposed AC attack model is reduced significantly.
As mentioned in Section II, the bad data is checked by examining the residual of the state estimation. So, if the injected data will not increase the resulting residual, then such an attack cannot be detected if the original state estimation can pass the bad data detection. The verifying method is very simple and straightforward. First, we determine the residuals without and with false data injection. If the latter is smaller than the former, then such an attack cannot be detected by the control center. The test results show that the residual without false data is 0.0772, and the residual with injected false data based on the method proposed in this paper is 0.0343. It verifies that the injected false data will not increase the residual; instead, they reduce the residual in most cases. This can be explained by the fact that the false data injected in the attacking region are constructed based on power flow equation, so it is consistent with the physical laws of the systems (KCL and KVL). This is equivalent to reducing the measuring errors of the measurements in the attacking region, so the overall residual will be decreased. only includes 28 buses, less than 1/4 of the total number of buses of the power network. However, A 3 covers more than 2/3 of the buses of the power network. For the purpose of illustration, we use attacking strategies A1, A2, A3 to represent an attacker attacks the measurements in region A1, A2, A3, respectively. Table III reports the residuals of the three attacking strategies (A1, A2 and A3) for different values of σ. One interesting observation is that as the size of attacking region increases, the overall residual of the state estimation will decrease more significantly. For instance, when σ = 5%, the residual will decrease from 16.89 to 15.15 if an attacker attacks the measurements in the smallest attacking region A 1 . However, if the attacker attacks the largest attacking region A 3 , the residual will be decreased to 9.62. A rough explanation for this trend is that when the attacking region has a larger size, more measurements will be enforced to be more consistent since the measurements in the attacking region are constructed based on AC power flow equations and are free of noise. This is equivalent to eliminating the measurement errors in the attacking region. Accordingly, the overall residual of the state estimation would be reduced.
B. Impact of the Sizes of Attacking Regions
This characteristic enables the proposed attack scheme to be tolerant to the estimation errors of angle differences among boundary buses. It can be seen from Table III that when σ is up to 15%, the residuals of attacking strategies A1, A2 and A3 are still less than 16.89 , that of the measurements without false data, which indicates that the three attacking strategies can be successful. In fact, the error of measurements in normal condition is far less than 15%. When σ is further increased to 45%, the residual of attacking strategy A1 will be greater than 16.89. So, attacking strategy A1 will fail. However, if an attacker enlarges the attacking region to A2 or A3, the corresponding attacking strategies can be still successful since the residuals are reduced to 15.82 or 10.50, less than 16.89.
We also test the performance of the attack scheme under stressful condition. This is because the DC power flow approximation does not perform well when the system is under Table IV reports the residuals of the three attacking strategies (A1, A2 and A3) under different load levels. It can be seen that the attacking strategies A1, A2 and A3 can be still successful when γ is increased to 2.5. In fact, around 30% of loads will be shed if an operator performs security constrained economic dispatch when γ = 2.5. Similarly, when γ is further increased to 3.0, strategy A1 will fail. However, this attack can be still successful if an attacker enlarges the attacking region to A2 or A3.
The reason why our attack scheme has a good tolerance to the estimation errors of angle differences is that these errors only impact the consistency of a small number of power injection measurements at the boundary buses in the attacking region. Therefore, when the size of the attacking region is relative large, most measurements in the attacking region will be consistent, which makes the overall residual smaller. When the attacking region is expanded, more measurements are consistent with KCL and KVL. Consequently, the residual will be further reduced. This indicates that the increase in the residual due to the estimation errors of angle differences can be offset by enlarging the attacking region.
The numbers of measurements that are needed to construct the attack vector for the three attacking regions are given in Table V . We can see that only a few number of measurements are needed. For example, if an attacker aims to attack the measurements in region A 3 , he/she needs to obtain 19 measurements to construct an undetectable attack vector. Consequently, the attacker will not pay a high cost to launch such an attack, which indicates power grids will be at high risk of cyber-attacks. Thus, it is very essential for us to develop some effective protection strategies, a subject for future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
It was revealed in one of our previous works that an attacker does not need to have the full network information in the [12] . In this paper, we continue to investigate the attack strategy against AC state estimation. It is shown that an attacker can still attack the state estimation without the full network of a power grid. The proposed attack scheme also relaxes the dependency of the absolute values of bus phase angles to construct an attack vector, one of the strong conditions in all previous works [14] - [16] on attacks against AC state estimation. Thus, our proposed model has enormous advantages of reducing the efforts to construct an attack vector, representing a much more realistic attacking model against AC state estimation.
Based on our model, we can study the attack behaviors of an attacker by investigating: 1) the minimum attack cost to launch an attack; 2) the critical measurements that must be attacked. This information can provide a reference for the defender to develop a cost-effective protection strategy or detection method. For example, if an attacker needs to obtain the network information of a large network, then there is no need to defend this attack since the attack is too expensive to occur. Additionally, it is very essential to verify the accuracy of the critical measurements determined by our attack model to detect such an attack.
It should be clarified that the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that an attacker is able to construct an undetectable attack vector against the AC state estimation without having the network information of the entire network and without obtaining any bus phase angle. Two issues need be addressed in the future. First, the impact of false data attacks on the operation of power systems in AC case will be investigated. Secondly, the optimality of the attack strategy is not discussed. For example, how does one select an optimal attacking region that minimizes the network information required to construct an attack vector and, in the meantime, causes the most serious consequences?
In the future, we will also explore the detection methods and protection strategies to mitigate the risk of power systems due to cyber-attacks that are local and against AC state estimation. However, this is not an easy task due to the stealth of injected false data. Some anomaly detection technique will be borrowed to achieve this goal in the next work.
APPENDIX A
The voltage magnitude, real/reactive power measurements for the IEEE 14-bus system are given in columns 2, 4, and 5 in Table VI , respectively. The line real flow (columns 2 and 3) and reactive flow measurements (columns 4 and 5) are given in Table VII. 
